I exchanged a “Bear Down” and got a big smile from Mike Bibby when we passed in an empty hallway. Jordan Ott and I shared the annoyance of a long line at Southwest Airlines bag drop on Sunday morning. But the presence of all of the coaches and front office executives in the same place is both necessary and unique. Everyone comes in, handles their business, and gets out.

Around that, actual basketball is being played. You can watch parts of a dozen games in a day for the price of a single NBA regular season ticket.1 Players, coaches, and referees are all fighting for their careers. Less visible is the scratching and clawing of those trying to get a foot in the door of NBA, WNBA, G-League or college front offices, and that’s where Sports Business Classroom comes in.

Last year, I had the opportunity to take part in SBC, a program designed for those interested in working in those positions. I detailed my experience in one of my first YouTube videos. This time, I returned as an alumnus, supporting the current batch of students.

In addition to taking in the wisdom of several high-profile speakers and networking with as many people as I could, my role was to participate in the mock GM exercise, where 20 teams are made up of students in the salary cap, scouting, and analytics majors, and the final 10 are run by alumni.2

The mock gives the students the chance to apply their learnings from the week to evaluate players and make moves with the franchise they are assigned. While the days are spent in the classroom setting, hearing from some of the best in the business, the nights back at the hotel are spent working on deals with other teams and agents. I spent Tuesday-Thursday coaching students who asked for help in preparation for the four-hour transaction window on Friday morning.

SBC Mock Results

This is the third full-scale mock exercise I have been a part of (two SBC and one at ASU’s Mock Trade Deadline event that I helped with). One of the things I have learned is that very smart people can have very different opinions about moves. While it’s tempting to name a winner and loser (team vs team in trade or team vs agent in signing or extension), I wanted to instead highlight the moves I thought were a win-win for both parties and thus could potentially see happening.

The mock exercise covered everything from July 14th, when the mock diverged from real life, to February 5th, the trade deadline. And if we look at the signings made in the “offseason”, I thought all of the major name free agents ended up in pretty reasonable spots.

Restricted free agent Jalen Duren returned to Detroit on a deal starting at less than 25% of the salary cap after the big man’s leverage was diminished and fellow RFA (and Wildcat) Bennedict Mathurin did the same with the Clippers just above the midlevel. Denver’s negotiations with their two RFA (Peyton Watson and Spencer Jones) effectively stretched later into the summer so I’ll hold on that for the moment (Spoiler: I was assigned to be the Denver GM).

Draymond Green and James Harden signed back with their current teams as well after LeBron James and his agent chose Minnesota for the taxpayer midlevel (2 years, $12.43 million with a player option).

Signings

Once you get past that level, it gets to be pretty slim pickings, but there were a couple of moves around the edges that made sense to me in terms of filling out benches.

Bruce Brown (Golden State Warriors) - 1 year, $4,500,000 via the taxpayer midlevel.

With only 11 players currently on roster3 and a nearly $36 million gap to their second apron hard cap, the Warriors definitely have work to do.

It could be as simple as signing two minimums and giving the rest of the money to Green, but in this case they opted to use a portion of their midlevel to secure Brown, a veteran wing that seems like a natural fit for Golden State.

I think he could be had for a minimum, but if this is what it took (and Green is willing to take a little less to get one of the few rotation caliber free agents left on the market), maybe paying a little extra made sense.

Nic Batum (San Antonio Spurs) - 1 year, $3,876,529 via the vet minimum exception, counting as $2,449,421 against cap, tax, and aprons.

I actually had to go check and make sure Batum hadn’t played for San Antonio before. He hasn’t, but I can already clearly picture him in a Spurs jersey.

Last year, San Antonio had Kelly Olynyk, Mason Plumlee, and Bismack Biyombo as veterans, but could really use one that could actually play. Batum certainly isn’t what he once was, but was still good enough last year to get on the floor. It only seems natural he continues the Spurs’ long-standing French connection.

The Spurs currently will have one open roster spot once Jordan McLaughlin signs and project to be $2.1 million under the luxury tax, which they almost assuredly will finish the year under to delay the start of their repeater tax clock. However, the $300k could be made up via an in-season trade (most likely Harrison Barnes’s $8 million expiring or McLaughlin).

Perhaps this would require Batum agreeing to a partial guarantee around $3 million just in case the Spurs don’t want to make a trade and need to cut a player before the January 10th guarantee date. That would proportionally get their tax hit under the threshold. They could then re-sign him near the end of the year to be on their playoff roster.

Bradley Beal (Orlando Magic) - 1 year, $3,876,529 via the vet minimum exception, counting as $2,449,421 against cap, tax, and aprons.

I wrote about Beal’s financial situation last year in response to his buyout with the Phoenix Suns, saying then that I found it unlikely he would sign for more than the $15 million non-taxpayer midlevel for 2026-2027. We are far past that now.

Beal declined his $5.6 million player option at the end of June and could re-sign with the Clippers using non-bird rights for up to 2 years, $13.2 million.4 This is the most likely option, and Los Angeles may have had a handshake agreement with Beal dating back to his signing last year that they would take care of him this offseason.5

With the Clippers rebuilding, and especially if they do retain Mathurin, there might be better options basketball wise for Beal. If he wanted to join a team that could really use his help to try to jump up into contention, Orlando is a prime candidate, as they are in desperate need of more shooting.

The Magic currently have one open roster spot along with the highest payroll in the league. Even a minimum contract would leave them only $50k in space below the second apron. Alternatively, they could waive Jamal Cain, whose contract is non-guaranteed, to offer Beal $5 million out of their taxpayer midlevel. This would hard cap them at the second apron, which reduces future flexibility, but I can’t really see them going over anyway.

Extensions

While July is made for free agency, August-October is the season of extensions in the NBA. First round draft picks entering their fourth year (draft class of 2023), as well as players on 3- or 4-year contracts starting on the second anniversary of the most recent signing or extension, or 5- or 6-year contracts starting on the third anniversary, are eligible for extension.

Anthony Black (Orlando Magic) - 5 years, $130,000,000 starting at $26,000,000 in 2027-2028.

Let’s stay in Orlando where the Magic will try to come to terms with former 6th overall pick, Anthony Black. As I said above, Orlando has a very expensive roster and that is true beyond this season as well.

For the second SBC in a row, the Magic GM opted not to “solve” the Paulo and Franz “problem”, but instead moved on from Jalen Suggs, taking back Fred VanVleet’s expiring salary among other things. That makes some sense if they think that Black can move into a starting role.

The mock Magic and Black’s agent agreed to a five-year $130 million extension that would put him under contract all the way through the 2031-2032 season, structured as $26 million in each year.

I think the real Magic might choose to start at a lower number for the same average annual value (AAV) since they are already facing financial constraints, but the flat structure would be a way to get Black a little bit more money earlier and hedge your bets in the long run if you’re the Magic.

Amen Thompson (Houston Rockets) - 4 years (PO), $156,630,600 starting at $39,157,650 in 2027-2028.

Thompson looked like a sure thing to get the 25% max only a year ago, but his offensive game has still yet to come around. The number there in the first year looks a little bit awkward, but it’s equal to 22.5% of the projected salary cap for next season. This seems like a good compromise for the Rockets to save a little money in the near term while also structuring this contract with no raises.

Thompson, meanwhile, receives a player option on only a four-year extension, which will set him up to be eligible to begin his next contract with seven years of service. If he does turn the corner offensively, he could demand the 30 percent max at that time.

Jordan Walsh (Boston Celtics) - 3 years (PO), $10,000,000 starting at $3,086,420 in 2027-2028.

Walsh’s salary for the upcoming season just became fully guaranteed. He is playing on the last year of a four-year contract for the minimum using the second-round pick exception. Walsh has made about $7.6 million in his career, so turning down a $10 million extension might be quite difficult, especially with a player option attached should he pop.

On the Celtics’ side, locking in a player that has proven to be a serviceable defensive rotation guy at just above the minimum seems like good business. Walsh would be an unrestricted free agent next summer so I like the idea of getting an extension done rather than letting him walk, but this can be done anytime during the season so no pressure.

An extension at this level would also make Walsh potentially tradable alongside another player on a minimum contract if needed to make a bigger move at a future trade deadline. Stacking multiple minimum salaries to make the financials of a trade work is no longer allowed during the season.

After I wrote this section but before I sent it out, Walsh and the Celtics agreed to a 3 year, $15 million deal ending in a team option. A little more money, but a flip of who holds the option compared to how it went down at SBC. All in all, very close.

Restricted Free Agency

In real life and mock offseason, RFA is a complicated and unfortunately antagonistic situation. Last summer, four high-profile players entered RFA after failing to come to terms with their team on an extension.

Chicago’s Josh Giddey came out the best, agreeing to a 4-year, $100 million offer with no raises or options. Jonathan Kuminga ultimately signed back with Golden State, albeit on a 2-year deal with a team option. He made $23.8 million last year, but is still searching for a home this offseason after being traded to Atlanta midseason. While I’m sure the Hawks would be happy to facilitate a sign-and-trade, they are now the second team seemingly willing to move on from Kuminga.

Quentin Grimes used the only leverage a RFA has and took the qualifying offer (QO) with Philadelphia, betting on himself for only $8.7 million. He has followed it up with some long-term security in the form of a 4 year, $60 million contract with the Los Angeles Lakers. Cam Thomas also took the QO and made $6 million but is now in danger of being out of the league.

This season Walker Kessler and the Jazz both agreed to a sign-and-trade to the Lakers. Meanwhile, Jalen Duren seems destined to go back to Detroit. If he takes a long-term deal, it will probably be at an amount less than he wants. Obviously, his other option is the more risky route of taking a qualifying offer of less than $10 million.

Denver

Along with Bennedict Mathurin, the two most important restricted free agency situations remaining both exist in Denver: Peyton Watson and Spencer Jones.6 As I hinted at earlier, I was the Nuggets’ mock GM for this exercise.

Denver is also expensive and with an ownership group that is not known as the most willing to spend money. The Nuggets were over the luxury tax in the three seasons previous to last. If the Nuggets are payers this year, they will do so at the “repeater” rate, a higher cost than non-repeater teams.

But Denver is already above the tax threshold by $10 million and below the second apron by only $4 million even before re-signing either Watson or Jones. They cannot easily fill out their final two required roster spots without tipping over.7

It seemed like the Nuggets had some decisions to make this offseason and would even take the temperature of the market for Jamal Murray and Aaron Gordon. I know I tried to in the mock exercise, especially with the former, but his $50 million contract wasn’t something teams were willing to build around.

In real life, Denver has done very little this offseason, signing only veteran minimums. The most important business of the offseason, signing the best player in their history, Nikola Jokic, to an extension, failed. Jokic opted not to sign an extension, and will have the chance to decline his player option at the end of next June, becoming an unrestricted free agent.

So there is a lot of pressure on the Nuggets to perform. However, I’m not sure that bringing back Watson and Jones to run it back for another year will end in any better result. The Nuggets were arguably a top four team in the west last season and might be again, but are certainly not in the top tier of contenders.

In my opinion, it is pretty unlikely that Denver wins the title this season no matter what they do, so one of the ways I looked at this was with a goal of having the best opportunity moving forward from the summer of 2027 to effectively pitch Jokic on that vision.

I did not think having large amounts of money committed to Murray, Gordon, Braun, and Watson was going to be a good foundation for that vision. With that in mind, I set out to try to find the best sign-and-trade deal that I could for Peyton Watson.

Sign-and-trades are inherently difficult because of base year compensation (BYC). Essentially, whatever value Watson was to agree to (call it, $30 million) would count as $30 million for the receiving team’s salary in the trade, but would only count as $15 million for the Nuggets sending money for salary matching purposes. That is why you almost always see sign-and-trade deals include a third team who can take on the extra salary.

The most interested party early on was the Milwaukee Bucks, who were trying to send back a mix of players and what little draft capital they have left. Part of the value Milwaukee wanted to send out in the trade was the contract of Tyler Herro, which I neither wanted nor could the Nuggets take on financially. At that point, both Milwaukee and I agreed to look for a third trade partner. I told them that I’d be looking for either a power forward that could play alongside Jokic or a shooting guard, preferably if one or both was defensively minded.

We discussed that if Detroit had not previously traded Isaiah Stewart, they would be a natural fit to take in Herro. However, I walked away from that discussion and urged Watson’s agent, who was working with me to find his client a team that would pay him, to have a chat with Memphis. A day later, they had agreed in principle to a deal starting at $25 million, given that terms could be agreed to on a sign and trade.

I researched what a trade might look like. Stewart has two years remaining at $15 million each, with the second a team option. It is really a great contract and I would be quite interested to see him play alongside Jokic. Unfortunately, there was no way to make the trade straight up Watson for Stewart because of BYC issues.

I approached the Grizzlies with the suggestion that they take both Watson and Braun, the latter of which most agreed was on a neutral value contract, but one that Denver could not afford. Because of an additional move that Memphis had made, they were far below the tax and could use their $28 million traded player exception (TPE) from the Jaren Jackson Jr. deal to take in one of the contracts.

I paid Chicago two second round picks to take Zeke Nnaji into their room midlevel which set up my ability to complete the sign-and-trade that would hard cap Denver at the second apron.

Denver receives: $110,000
Chicago receives: Zeke Nnaji via RMLE, 2028 MIN SRP, 2031 SAC SRP

Denver receives: Isaiah Stewart, Ty Jerome, and GG Jackson8
Memphis receives: Peyton Watson via sign-and-trade, and Christian Braun via TPE9

Peyton Watson (Memphis Grizzlies) - 4 years (PO), $107,500,000 starting at $25,000,000 in 2026-2027.

These moves left the Nuggets about $5.3 million under the second apron, which they were now hard capped at. I had previously offered Spencer Jones’s agent a deal for 3 years, $13 million. They wanted 2 years, $12 million, which I thought was above what they could get from another team so I invited them to try to go find that deal. Golden State was willing to use their biannual exception to sign Jones to an offer sheet of 2 years at $5,477,000 each, which was unfortunately more than Denver could currently afford.

The extended calendar aspect of the mock would have allowed me to stretch Jonas Valanciunas’s $2 million cap hit over three years, opening another $1.33 million in headroom for this season to match the Jones offer sheet. In real life, that decision will be interesting for Denver, who must make that call by the end of August, perhaps before they are certain how these RFA situations will unravel.

In hindsight, I wish I had worked more with Jones’s agent to come to an agreement. Denver could have paid the same money over two years but including an 8% raise, which would have negated their need to stretch the dead cap hit.

In the end, Denver picks up a physical, defensive-minded big man that can play alongside Jokic or in backup center minutes, along with more shooting on the perimeter. More importantly, they clear out their cap sheet.

Stewart will have a team option and Jerome a player option that he could possibly decline and sign back for multiple years starting at a lower number if it helps. The other salaries on the books are small except for the big three. The Nuggets get to try a different mix and remain competitive for 2026-2027 and kick the can down the road to next summer on any big changes.

By staying under the second apron, their 2034 pick will be tradable next offseason, perhaps along with Murray or Gordon, who would each have two years remaining under contract. It’s not a perfect plan to retain Jokic, but it at least gives the Nuggets a little more flexibility and time to find said plan.

Trades

Making a truly balanced trade is pretty difficult. Finding a potential partner who is willing to give up the things you want and whose goals match up with what you are offering is hard alone. Dealing with all of the rules and negotiating draft capital makes any trade lucky to get across the finish line.

One trade that intrigued me, but ultimately didn’t get done involved the Lakers, who out of all 30 teams, probably had the most controversial mock, after being saddled with a Walker Kessler move that was not thought highly of by most at SBC. Their attempts to build a contender got mixed reviews, but they did at least explore another path.

Los Angeles reportedly declined an offer of Brandon Miller (who had signed a 5 year $192 million contract extension), Naz Reid, Moussa Diabate, and three unprotected first round picks for Luka Doncic.

Doncic will almost assuredly decline his player option in 2028-2029 so he can re-sign at the 35% maximum with his 10 years of service. That means the Lakers have two years remaining to prove to him that he should stay. I don’t see this year’s team being a beacon of hope, which would mean next summer would be very tenuous with only one season remaining and no first rounders to send out to try to improve further.

We are seeing this play out in Denver with Jokic and we just ended this saga in Milwaukee with Giannis. Waiting until the final year allowed Giannis to exert control on the trade process by letting teams know where he would be willing to sign an extension. That suppressed the value the Bucks were able to get in return. Meanwhile, Jokic may walk for nothing.

I do not subscribe to the theory that any player is untradeable.10 The Charlotte package is far stronger than any that Milwaukee received for Giannis. Miller starting his extension at 20% of the salary cap and under contract for six seasons along with Reid’s three years plus an option totally resets the Lakers’ clock while refilling some of their depleted draft pick inventory.

For Charlotte, this is the way to get a number one guy to pair with the young, cheap talent they already have on roster. Perhaps they are just as well off waiting another season though and seeing what they have with this group, improving incrementally and trying to make the playoffs. Next summer, they might be able to swing a similar deal for far less.

Charlotte receives: Kel’el Ware
Milwaukee receives: Ryan Kalkbrenner, 2027 CHA FRP, 2027 MEM SRP

The Hornets did get this deal done, upgrading their frontcourt with a player on the same timeline as Miller and Knueppel.

Ware, the number 15 overall pick in 2024, will be extension eligible next offseason. I’m always skeptical of paying a guy at market value long before you have your star in house. The Bucks are just at the beginning of a rebuild that will take some time.

In this trade, they pick up a first round pick from Charlotte, who has not made the playoffs yet with this group. With the new lottery odds coming into effect, that pick could be valuable if the Hornets somehow slip into the lottery again. The Memphis second rounder is likely to be a good one, even more so if they end up in the relegation zone.11

Sacramento receives: Jakob Poeltl, Ja’Kobe Walter, 2028 TOR FRP, $1,000,000
Toronto receives: Keegan Murray, Dae’Qwon Plowden

If the Kings are realistic about their outlook, taking on negative value contracts with assets is a good way to go. Poeltl is about as distressed an asset as there is out there. As Sacramento, I would have tried to get the Raptors’ 2029 pick unprotected just because it is one year later, and their 2027 which will be the worst of four teams, but still good to have. Plus, they get a second draft guy in Walter to try out.

Toronto turns Poeltl into a wing that can play for them in the playoffs for the price of one first round pick that they hope will be in the 20s.

Wrap-up

There were plenty of other trades in the mock, both moves around the edges, and full-blown blockbusters, but usually ones I had an opinion on one way or the other. Every time I partake in one of these exercises, I learn something new. Plus, they are a ton of fun.

If you want to learn more, a great place to start is Bobby Marks’s transaction tracker, where he explains each move that is made from a salary cap perspective, or Yossi Gozlan’s Third Apron substack and podcast. And the best source of salary information and best trade machine live at Spotrac.com, home of my friend Keith Smith.

These are three of the most knowledgeable people in the world in this area and they are also instructors at Sports Business Classroom. I’ve been very lucky to hang out with and learn from these guys the last two years.

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If you are unfamiliar with the NCAA version that released in March, I will give a quick overview of the features that are the same, and then highlight additional features unique to the pro game.

Same as NCAA - More Detail Here

Four Factors - Points per possession (PPP), shooting efficiency (eFG%), rebounding (ORB%), turnovers (TO%), and free throw rate (FTR).

Lineups - Comparison of players on the floor sorted by player size instead of jersey number. Identify cross-matches and offensive roles for each team.

Rotations - Visual representation of player stints. Observe substitution patterns, track game flow with the win probability chart, and check minutes played, plus/minus (+/-), and personal fouls.

Substitutions and Rewind Mode - Logs of every substitution. Click a substitution to display lineups from earlier points in the game. Review key stretches and analyze the matchups.

**NEW FEATURE** Click the rotation charts to enter rewind mode.

New for NBA Coach’s Gamecast

This is where this version becomes more powerful. Rules for Timeouts, Challenges, and Team Fouls1 are much more complex in the NBA than NCAA, which is a good thing for a smart coach. As the rules become more complicated, there is a greater ability to gain an edge by using them to your advantage.

If you haven’t seen my previous article explaining NBA timeouts and challenges, along with strategic considerations involved, I strongly suggest you give it a read now. It is essentially a prerequisite for understanding what Coach’s Gamecast displays.

Teams get one challenge per game and earn a second if the first is successful. Unlike college, winning a challenge does not necessarily mean the team gets to keep their timeout. If a team is using a second challenge, or if the challenge triggers a mandatory timeout, the team will still be charged a timeout for their successful challenge.2

In this gamecast, challenges are shown as “call overturned” or “call stands”, with indicators of which timeouts were charged. Timeouts are less easily judged as simply successful or not. However, the complex timeout rules of the NBA lead to some useful categorization.

Timeout Types

Preemptive - A timeout taken by a team before the time they would be charged with one. For example, if the home team takes the first timeout of the quarter at 8:15.

Away First - The first timeout of a quarter if it is taken by the away team, thus delaying the home team’s mandatory timeout from 7:00 to 3:00.

Forced - A mandatory timeout assigned to a team due to a dead-ball after either the 7:00 or 3:00 mark. The gamecast includes whether the team assigned the timeout will be on offense or defense coming out of the huddle.

Just in Time - A live-ball timeout taken by a team that would have been assigned a mandatory timeout at the next dead-ball (e.g., the home team takes the first timeout of the quarter at 6:45).

Double Mandatory - The second timeout of a quarter taken by the same team that took or was charged with the first timeout of the quarter.

Forfeited - Timeouts lost at the end of the third quarter, with three minutes left in the game3, or at the start of an overtime period.

Voluntary - All other timeouts. The first and second timeouts of a quarter are never voluntary. All overtime timeouts, two per OT with no carryover, are voluntary.

These timeout types can be hypothesized to be better or worse than one another. I hold two assumptions:

1. Timeouts are good for the team that uses them. They are a tool in the coach’s kit.

2. Timeouts are most often better for the team that is next on offense, partially because coaches can draw up after-timeout (ATO) plays.4 The cases where this is not true are most often in late game situations, which are not part of the mandatory timeout equation.

The first assumption I think is fairly reasonable and suggests that forfeiting timeouts is undesirable. Most often I see timeouts forfeited by teams in blowout wins. However, I have seen cases where teams forfeit multiple timeouts in losses and that raises a red flag for me.

The latter assumption warrants further analysis that I may be able to do in the future now that I have a multi-year NBA timeout database. But if it holds, the “Forced - Defense” type of timeout is also undesirable. If a team waits until it is charged a mandatory timeout at a dead-ball, and the other team will inbound after the timeout, the application will highlight that timeout in red.

Both “Forced - Offense” and “Just in Time” imply that the team next to be charged a mandatory timeout has allowed the game clock to fall below the time threshold. In the case of “Forced - Offense”, there was a dead-ball, but the team was fortunate to be in possession when it occurred. This is displayed with an orange fill.

“Just in Time” would cover the case where, for example, a team dribbles into the frontcourt and takes a timeout prior to the dead-ball that would force them into one. This still indicates that the team has taken some risk and therefore is shown in yellow.5

The other yellow-coded type is the “Away First” timeout. NBA timeout rules are advantageous to the road team as they are charged the latter mandatory timeout each period. While there may be a perfectly good reason for an away team to use the first timeout of a quarter, it does provide the home team a reprieve. Depending on how close to 7:00 it was taken, a coach may have been better off waiting. These require closer inspection.

An “Away First” timeout also opens the door for a potential away-team “Double Mandatory” timeout. Either side could take the first two timeouts of a quarter, thus allowing the other team an exemption from a mandatory timeout in that period. This effectively gives the opponent an additional “Voluntary” timeout to be used prior to the next potential forfeiture checkpoint.

“Double Mandatory” timeouts are highlighted in orange, while “Voluntary” timeouts are in a light yellow, indicating they might be worth reviewing to better understand why they were used.

Finally, “Preemptive” timeouts are shown in gray as they represent standard practice. However, there still could be better or worse uses. If a home team takes their first timeout early in a quarter (e.g., 10:30) and the away team follows with a timeout at 9:30, both would be “Preemptive”. But the away team preempted a timeout that would not have been mandatory until the dead-ball under 3:00. If they could have held off longer, perhaps the home team would have taken a “Double Mandatory”.

How to Use

1. Select a game from the scoreboard or team schedule pages.

2. Click any substitution to view previous lineups. Or click within the rotations chart.

3. Read tooltips (hover) to learn more.

Notes

• Data reliability depends on ESPN APIs.

• The app is intended for games from the 2017-2018 season and beyond because timeout rules were significantly different before then.

• Challenges were introduced in 2019-2020 and starting in 2023-2024, teams could earn a second challenge if they won their first. The app will adapt depending on the game year.

• Coach’s Gamecast currently refreshes data every 30 seconds for live games.

• I prefer the desktop version so I can see all the elements simultaneously, but I have worked to optimize the mobile UI as well so I can still use the app while I am at games in person.

Feedback

What have I missed that would make this tool even better?

Please provide feature requests or report issues whenever possible. And please do share with anyone else that you think might be interested.

Thanks, hope you enjoy!

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This year’s group currently ranks 14th in offense and 5th in defense.1 After finishing 27th defensively a year ago, this group has developed an identity as a hard-playing, unselfish team and because of that, they are much more enjoyable to watch.

But they are 11-13 in games against teams with winning records and have the ninth hardest strength of schedule in the league remaining.2 Absent a playoff draw against an injury-saddled opponent, it seems that a reasonable trajectory for this team is a first-round playoff exit.

With that in mind, let’s take a look at the Suns roster, what options they have, and where they should be going from here.

Roster

To give Phoenix credit, they have done a great job bringing in and developing players in the last two seasons.

Ryan Dunn and Oso Ighodaro, both of whom the Suns traded for on draft night in 2024, are showing growth. Collin Gillespie (minimum veteran salary, coming off a two-way), Jordan Goodwin (off waivers), and Jamaree Bouyea (two-way) have held down the point guard position admirably.

And while it’s still too early to judge returns on Jalen Green and to a lesser degree, Mark Williams, Dillon Brooks has been a home run. No one deserves more credit for the identity change than he does.

I’ve listed players in what I consider to be their natural position. However, both Rasheer Fleming and Nigel Hayes-Davis have played limited minutes, with Brooks, O’Neale, and Dunn spending time at the four.

The Suns packaged multiple picks to trade up for Fleming and long-term, would hope that 2025 first round draft pick, Khaman Maluach, is the prize piece in return from trading Kevin Durant to Houston. Both have spent time in the G League this season but will need to see the NBA floor significantly more in 2026-2027 for that investment to be on track.

That may necessitate trading one of the above small forwards to clear the space for Fleming and/or Ighodaro to get more run at power forward if Maluach moves into the backup center minutes.3

If the Suns wanted to be buyers at the deadline, power forward would be the natural place to look to upgrade. As far as weaknesses to address, Phoenix is currently ranked 23rd in defensive rebound percentage while fouling the fourth most in the league, per Cleaning the Glass.

Draft Pick Inventory

On February 9th, 2023, Phoenix sent Mikel Bridges, Cameron Johnson, four first round picks, and one swap to Brooklyn to acquire Kevin Durant.

The preceding eight months had seen Donovan Mitchell traded for three first round picks and two swaps and Rudy Gobert traded for (effectively) five first round picks and a swap. Even Dejounte Murray garnered a haul of three first round picks and one swap.

Trading for Durant was an all in move for a franchise that had held a 2-0 finals lead less than two years prior and was coming off of a 2021-2022 season in which they set the franchise record for wins, before a very disappointing second round exit. The market was inflated, but this was Kevin Durant, and he would be the missing piece.

After injuries to Durant and Chris Paul played a factor in a Suns second round playoff exit, the Suns chose to double down, sending four first round pick swaps and six second rounders to Washington to bring in Bradley Beal.

Two and a half years later, the Suns have zero playoff game wins to show for it. Mikel Bridges was traded to New York for another five first rounders and Cameron Johnson went to Denver for one pick plus Michael Porter Jr, who very well may be flipped for two more by the deadline

Toumani Camara, who was traded to move on from Deandre Ayton, has become one of the best defensive wings in the league for Portland, while Phoenix later paid a first round pick to dump Jusuf Nurkic to Charlotte. Nassir Little, who was also acquired in the Ayton trade along with Nurkic, remains on the Suns cap sheet as dead money through 2030, after being waived and his salary stretched, same as Bradley Beal and EJ Liddell.

The Suns also traded their 2031 first round pick to Utah unprotected, which effectively netted Mark Williams and the least favorable of Utah, Cleveland, and Minnesota’s first round selections in 2027.

So what picks do the Suns still have in their coffers? Horcruxed4 first rounders in 2027, 2028, and 2030, their own pick in 20325, along with second rounders in 2026, 2029, and 2032.6 And because of the Stepien Rule7, Phoenix cannot trade any of those first round picks outright until after this year’s draft.8

Trade Prospects

How would someone go about turning a paper clip into a house? To start, you trade that paper clip for a fish-shaped pen.9

In 2016, amid rumors that Kevin Durant was not a lock to return to Oklahoma City, the Thunder completed a draft night deal to send Serge Ibaka to Orlando. Ibaka had finished second in defensive player of the year voting in 2012 and 2013, and was viewed as one of the elite rim protectors in the league.

OKC was not necessarily blowing up their team, but viewed Ibaka’s value as at its peak, and chose to trade him for Victor Oladipo, who had previously been drafted #2 overall but not lived up to it with the Magic, and the 11th pick in that year’s draft, Domantas Sabonis.

One year later, Ibaka was no longer with the Magic after being traded to Toronto for Terrence Ross and the draft pick that had become Anžejs Pasečniks. Meanwhile, Oladipo and Sabonis were no longer with the Thunder, as they were traded together for Paul George.10

It’s at this point that basketball fans can see the paper-clip funded house in the distance. Only two years later, on July 10, 2019, Paul George was traded to the Los Angeles Clippers. The return: five first round picks, two swaps, and an all-rookie second-team guard named Shai Gilgeous-Alexander.

Even Sam Presti would tell you that it was not his plan to trade Serge Ibaka in order to eventually land the 2025 NBA MVP. But the lesson to learn is, buy low, sell high, and do that enough times that good things could happen. Buying low, on second draft guys11 like Oladipo, on non-premium draft picks, like the rights to Sabonis, or distressed assets, like Paul George’s contract, are not exactly easy, but it is still the “easy part.”

Deciding when to sell high, especially when the team is good, is extremely difficult. Which brings us back to the Suns, who are, at this moment, good.

Nick Richards

Let’s start with an option that isn’t too painful. Richards has slipped out of the rotation this season, but might be of some use to another team looking to fill backup center minutes. An unrestricted free agent this summer, currently making $5 million, I don’t think Richards is in Phoenix’s long-term plans.

With the Suns sitting only $255,632 over the tax threshold, swapping Richards for a player making a minimum salary (~$2.3M) would be a clean way for Phoenix to duck the tax and be halfway to resetting their clock as a tax repeater team.

Jordan Goodwin

Goodwin has been perhaps the Suns’ most exciting player in January, including an 8-13 3FG performance in a win over Oklahoma City. However, with Collin Gillespie’s emergence and the potential to convert Jamaree Bouyea’s contract after the deadline, along with Jalen Green’s upcoming return, Goodwin might be the odd man out.

Goodwin is also an unrestricted free agent this summer and will turn 28 around the start of next season. He is on a minimum contract this season. If the Suns could send him elsewhere, for a second time in his career, and collect a second round pick or two, that might be a good move.

Collin Gillespie

Also on a minimum deal, Gillespie has risen to the ranks of starting level point guard this season and the Suns should try to retain him long-term. Phoenix will hold his early-bird rights this summer and with the success and opportunity available in Phoenix, I would think he will want to re-sign.

Grayson Allen and Royce O’Neale

These two vacillate between serviceable starters, solid bench players, and guys you maybe don’t want on your books for another two seasons. Their salaries, $16,875,000 and $10,125,000 respectively, sit in a weird middle range.

I’m not sure either would fetch a significant return and it would likely be better to roll with them through the end of the year and see what options are available with a more flexible market in the summer. That being said, if their inclusion helps to complete a bigger deal, or cut costs for the future, the Suns shouldn’t hesitate to do it.

Ryan Dunn, Oso Ighodaro, Khaman Maluach, and Rasheer Fleming

All of these guys are under contracts with multiple years of team control remaining and potential to improve. Unless someone values them highly and bowls Phoenix over with an offer, they are here to stay.

Mark Williams and Nigel Hayes-Davis - Restricted Free Agents

The Suns invested two first round picks to trade for Williams this offseason, presumably with the intention of re-signing him in restricted free agency this summer. Williams’s skill has never been in question, and his appearance in 37 of 42 games this season has at least temporarily quieted concerns about his injury risk.

Meanwhile, Hayes-Davis has not made a significant impact that would lead me to believe that there would be much interest at the deadline, other than to open a roster spot. He is also a restricted free agent this upcoming summer and if Phoenix sees upside, they should be able to get him back on a minimum.

Jalen Green

Green is exactly the type of player that the Suns should be taking a shot on: a highly drafted, new environment, potential star. Unfortunately, he has missed all but two games so far this season. Therefore, Phoenix will likely wish to take any decision into next season before making any further moves.

Green is in the first year of a 2+1 extension that he received from Houston, but is extension eligible again next October. Unless he breaks out in the playoffs, I can’t imagine the Suns will be interested in doing that.

In the worst case scenario where Green underperforms in the next year, the Suns would not be forced to sell low. It would be unlikely in that case that Green would decline his player option unless a team-friendly longer deal was appealing. So Phoenix effectively has two more years to see if his stock rises.

Dillon Brooks

Now for the hard part. As I said earlier, Brooks deserves a ton of credit for the Suns’ turnaround this year. He is Phoenix’s second leading scorer and their perimeter stopper on defense.12

He is also turning 30 this week and is, in my opinion, a floor-raiser, not a ceiling-raiser. It is very unlikely that a team with Brooks on it will be bad, but only once has he advanced out of the first round, a 2021-2022 season in Memphis in which he missed more than half the year as the Grizzlies claimed the 2-seed.

I maintain a database of NBA player comps based on player type informative statistics and impact metrics. Here are five players that are statistically similar to Dillon Brooks: Zaccharie Risacher, De’Andre Hunter, Cameron Johnson, Kevin Huerter, and Brice Sensabaugh.

Brooks is older than all five of those players and makes more money than all but Hunter. His trade value will never be higher than it is right now. If the Suns can stomach it, they should be shopping his value around the league. To me, this is the most important piece of business the Suns have on their docket.

To further complicate things, Brooks is extension eligible this summer, looking to secure perhaps the final big payday of his career after showing out for the Suns this season. If he would be open to something like two additional years at $40 million, that’s something to discuss. However, Brooks is eligible for a four-year $125 million extension, running through 2031, when Brooks will be 35.

If his camp is asking for something like that in an extension, there could be significant discontent as soon as next season. Brooks has historically had a shelf life on a team before he starts to rub people the wrong way, his time in Memphis ending with the Grizzlies informing him they wouldn’t re-sign him under any circumstances.

Devin Booker

And the really hard part. The Suns should be looking for opportunities to move on from their franchise player.

Booker is re-engaged this season and worthy of consideration as an All-Star. He currently sits 15th in LEBRON WAR and if the Suns continue on their pace, will warrant All-NBA discussion, partially because the 65-game minimum will rule some others out. He has two previous All-NBA appearances, including a first-team in 2021-2022.

But his three-point percentage has fallen consistently since then, down from 38.3% to 30.1% this year. He ranks 26th in EPM and 40th in DPM and you can see where that is trending.

It is reasonable to think that Booker is somewhere between the 20th and 35th best player in the NBA at this moment. But eight teams have multiple players ranked higher than Booker in expected EPM, Booker’s better multi-season impact metric.

At best, Booker is the second best player on a contender and the Suns have no clear path to acquiring a “best player”. Meanwhile, Booker is paid the 9th most in the league.

Phoenix made the decision to extend Booker last summer even though he had three years remaining on his current deal. The extension will pay $145 million over two years.

Booker is currently projected to be the 3rd highest paid player in 2029-2030, behind Jayson Tatum and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, two players who have already been the best player on a championship team and are two years younger. Booker even has a player option on that final year; although at age 33, he would only decline that as part of an agreement to add more years at a lower average number.

We just watched this story play out in Atlanta with Trey Young, who was traded for neutral value (no picks and no significant players). Memphis is having similar issues shopping Ja Morant. The 2026 summer may be the last time that the Suns could move Booker for a positive return. By 2028, they would likely need to attach a pick to get off of his contract.

Trade Hypotheticals

The Suns have been adamant that they are not parting with Devin Booker, who is trade eligible again as of January 10th, the six month anniversary of his extension. But let’s start with what they could return if they were interested.

Devin Booker For Young Players and/or Picks

Best Potential Partners: Chicago, Detroit, San Antonio

The Pistons (Harris and two of Ivey, LeVert, and Holland) and the Spurs (Barnes, Olynyk, and either Johnson or Vassell)13 could be in a better position this season if they trade for Booker, but my estimate is that they will make moves around the edges, if anything, and keep their powder dry after they see what they look like in these playoffs.

However, for Chicago, who has been stuck just under .500 for the past three seasons and are currently projected to be in the play-in again, now might be the time to make a move in one direction or another.

Having locked up Josh Giddey at a reasonable number through 2029, the next important business that the Bulls have with their current roster is Coby White’s upcoming free agency. White and Giddey have some duplicative skillsets and I expect Chicago to attempt to sign-and-trade White rather than retain him long-term.

Other than Giddey, the only players I would consider part of the Bulls’ future are Matas Buzelis, who remains on his rookie contract through 2028, and perhaps Noa Essengue, who has missed most of his rookie season with injury.

Chicago has some big expiring contracts. Nikola Vucevic could likely be traded for positive value, but Zach Collins and Kevin Huerter could not. The Bulls would also love to get off of Patrick Williams’s contract, which currently sits on their books through 2029.

The Bulls hold all seven of their first round picks plus a Portland pick that is lottery protected in 2026, 2027, and 2028 before reverting to a second rounder. They also have their own second round picks in 2028-2032.

Bulls Receive: Devin Booker, Nick Richards, and Nigel Hayes-Davis.

Suns Receive: Patrick Williams, Zach Collins, Kevin Huerter, the Bulls’ 2029 first round pick, the Bulls’ 2031 first round pick, and first round pick swap rights in 2028.

Bulls Rationale: Chicago will not be bad enough to full on tank nor have they ever shown interest to in the past when they were better set up for it. Booker fits well with Giddey and Buzelis and signals that the Bulls are serious about contending soon.

They retain their 2026 first rounder with an 11.2% chance at a top-3 pick, along with the future Portland pick, their own picks in 2027 and 2033 (once this summer hits), and swap possibilities in 2030 and 2032.

If Giannis Antetokounmpo fails to sign an extension this summer, the Bucks will face the choice of moving him or potentially losing him for nothing the following summer. A sign-and-trade of Coby White in the range of the $30 million dollars that he supposedly wants, would be just enough, considering base year compensation, to be paired with the contracts of Isaac Okoro, Jalen Smith, and Tre Jones to go get the Greek Freak.

Chicago would be able to fill out their roster with the full non-taxpayer midlevel and biannual exception, along with minimums, and still not enter the tax in 2026-2027. Signing another NTMLE in 2027 would push the Bulls to the tax the following year, but they would be able to stay under the first apron.

If the Bucks played out the 2026-2027 season with Antetokounmpo, the Bulls would be perfectly set up to be a cap space team in the summer of 202714, the last year before Buzelis’s extension would take effect. With a complementary star like Devin Booker, and rising young players Giddey and Buzelis, Chicago seems like a place that Giannis would sign a long-term extension or new contract. Only an hour and a half from Milwaukee, this could be a nice fit.

Suns Rationale: When in doubt, trade with the Bulls or Kings (or Pelicans recently). Getting two unprotected picks could be a windfall. 2029 seems far away to wait, much less 2031, but that is kind of the point. Booker’s extension will have kicked in and the party may be over already in Chicago by then.

The Suns also regain some value in their 2028 pick in a couple of ways:

1. Currently, that pick is set to be the worst of four teams, nearly guaranteed to fall in the late first round. By adding swap rights, there is at least some chance it lands at a higher spot, which is nice because…

2. Phoenix will now be able to trade that 2028 pick outright, having added a 2029 pick to their inventory, thus avoiding the constraints of the Stepien rule. The same is true of their “least of three teams” pick in 2030, as they also add a 2031 pick in this deal.

There’s no question that this would be upsetting to some Suns fans, but Phoenix could lean into a much younger core group and try to develop. Plus, Jalen Green would get a clear runway to see what he could become.15 And Devin Booker gets a chance to play on a real contender in his late prime, which he definitely deserves.

An Out-of-the-Box Possible Option

Since the Suns are definitely not going to change course and trade Devin Booker just because I think they should, I’ve been toying with another possibility; however, there’s a lot of uncertainty with it.

The NBA has teased expansion for a long time, most often with Seattle and Las Vegas as the predicted locations. The CBA does not actually contain a ton of language about how expansion is handled and if the NBA were to expand, those rules would likely be re-evaluated.

However, if we went back to the last time the NBA had a two-team expansion, in 1995 with the introduction of the Grizzlies and Raptors, each existing team was able to protect up to eight players from their current rosters16, with all remaining players under contract pooled for the two new teams to pick from in an expansion draft. The Raptors selected 14 players and the Grizzlies 13, one from every existing team.

What is in the CBA?

1. Existing teams receive a traded player exception equal to the salary of the player they lose in the expansion draft.

2. Expansion teams are able to cut any of the players that they drafted before the start of the season without them counting against the cap. The player is still paid.

Aging players making 35% of the salary cap are not typically what an expansion franchise should be looking for. Not without risk, there is some opportunity here to use expansion as a pseudo-amnesty clause. If the Suns were to line up their contracts to have nine or fewer players on roster at the time of expansion and left Booker unprotected, one of the expansion teams would be forced to take him.17

If that team then cut him, he would be an unrestricted free agent, able to sign with whatever team he wants. From everything I can find, this would include the Suns.

While Phoenix would no longer hold his Bird rights, perhaps Booker would be happy to return to The Valley on a lesser deal like the midlevel, considering he would still be making the max money extension that the Suns just gave him.

Pair that with a $64 million dollar trade exception if this expansion were to occur in the summer of 2028 and all of a sudden the Suns have their path to another star.

Nick Richards to Duck the Tax

Best Potential Partners: Boston, New Orleans

Okay, we’ve played around in my fantasy world long enough so let’s get back to a boring, but much more likely reality.

Celtics Receive: Nick Richards.18

Suns Receive: Chris Boucher.

Celtics Rationale: Luka Garza is currently the backup center for a team that might soon be the favorite to win the Eastern Conference. Having another center to try might not hurt.

Jordan Walsh and Josh Minott have emerged so Boucher has not played since November. Thoughts of trying to get under the tax this year are gone with how well Boston and, especially recently, Anfernee Simons have played.

Suns Rationale: In 50 games with Toronto last season, Boucher shot 36.3% from three on 10.8 attempts per 100 possessions. He had a 19.6% defensive rebound percentage, which would rank 20th for power forwards who have played 100 minutes this year.

Nick Richards has fallen out of the lineup and Phoenix has a more pressing need at power forward than center. The Suns should get under the tax with how close they are and this move gets them there.

Jordan Goodwin for Upside

Best Potential Partners: Cleveland, Houston, Minnesota, New York

Playoff series often require flexible rotations so I think there would be a lot of contenders interested in having Goodwin as a defensive and rebounding guard off the bench.

Knicks Receive: Jordan Goodwin.

Suns Receive: Pacome Dadiet. Washington’s 2027 second round pick (if Washington picks 1-8 in 2026)

Knicks Rationale: New York has plenty of guards (Brunson, McBride, Clarkson, Kolek) but not of this type. Goodwin could be a factor on a team looking to win a title.

Dadiet can’t crack the rotation and may get his fourth year option declined. For a team that flirts with the second apron, cutting a little money next year isn’t bad.

Pick-wise, best case scenario, Trey Young plays more than expected and with a little lottery luck the Knicks get Washington’s pick at #9 this year and the pick in this trade extinguishes.

Suns Rationale: Second draft guy. Give Dadiet a chance in a new environment and see what happens. What does it hurt for the Suns to have him for two years?

I’m going to bet against Washington until they prove me wrong. They tank this year and the obligation to New York becomes two second round picks. Maybe that 2027 ends up higher in the second round than you might think.

Goodwin has played the best ball of his career. At age 27, this is probably near his peak. No guarantee Phoenix could bring him back next year, nor should they try to at more than the minimum.

Sell High on Dillon Brooks

Best Potential Partners: Atlanta, Detroit, LA Lakers

As I said above, I think getting value for Dillon Brooks is a big deal. A reminder that only six months ago, Brooks was considered salary filler necessary for the Rockets to send out in order to acquire Kevin Durant.

Brooks’s play so far this season has been an outlier compared to the rest of his career as far as individual creation and shot efficiency, especially on two's away from the rim. It’s these types of opportunities, that will determine how quickly Phoenix can get back to being a real contender.

Pistons Receive: Dillon Brooks and Nigel Hayes-Davis

Suns Receive: Ron Holland, Caris LeVert, and Detroit’s 2026 First Round Pick.

Pistons Rationale: Detroit leans into their identity as a defensive terror, adding Brooks, who can flex between the two forward positions. He also adds a second side scoring option with some ability to shoot.

Holland and LeVert are playing the 7th and 8th most minutes for the Pistons but Jaden Ivey and/or Javonte Green can backfill those minutes as backend rotation guys. The pick will be late first round and Detroit is in win-now mode anyways.

Suns Rationale:

Phoenix gets below the tax with this move, picks up a young player with upside in Holland, and banks a first round pick in the upcoming draft in which they currently hold none. They likely try to flip this pick on draft night.

LeVert’s deal becomes an expiring contract next season and can be aggregated with others to make a subsequent deal if the Suns desire.

Buy! Buy! Buy!

Let’s play devil’s advocate here and look at what the Suns could do as buyers at this deadline. The play would be to flip Jalen Green or aggregate the salaries of Grayson Allen and Royce O’Neal to bring back a better player that makes up to $6.3 million more, as the Suns would be constrained by the first apron.

The problem is that Phoenix has no draft capital to attach. I see all three guys as pretty close to neutral value so you’re talking about bringing back a player that likely has issues of their own (cough, Ja, cough).

All three guys are under contract through next year and the Suns will have at least two first round picks to trade this summer, potentially a third if they find a taker for Brooks. Then, Phoenix might really be able to go hunting.

I still think that would be a rush job on a team that is not as close to contention as ownership would like to think, but I would prefer getting an expensive and really good player to making a move now for a moderately expensive and mediocre player.

2026 Offseason

If the Suns stay pat at the deadline, or only send and receive expiring contracts, here is what their cap table will look like on July 119, with Ighodaro almost definitely getting fully guaranteed (partial guarantee is why he shows in red):

With over $23 million of dead money on their books (Beal/Little/Liddell), they will be $21.6 million from the tax line and $28.7 million from the first apron. It’s pretty safe to say that the Suns are going to blow by both of those numbers. This is just the nature of returning your five highest paid players and then wanting to re-sign two other starters.

Unless they make some moves to lower costs, Phoenix is going to be dancing with the second apron in 2026-2027. That threshold is $41.5 million away. Here are some of the second apron restrictions:

• If the Suns finish the year above the second apron, their 2034 pick would be frozen. Maybe more importantly, if they went over again in either of the following two years, their 2032 pick would be moved to the end of the first round.

• If they are over, they can’t use or have used the taxpayer midlevel ($6.1 million).

• If they are over, they can’t aggregate or have aggregated contracts to bring back a larger contract.

While you can debate the priority of concern on these, I’m fairly confident the Suns are most concerned with the third.

If you assume that the Suns want to use the taxpayer MLE ($6.1 million) then fill out the roster with minimums (2 at $2.5 million each)20, there is about $30 million to use on Williams and Gillespie and still have a little bit of space. If it takes more than that, the Suns would need to send out enough money in any trade, to bring them back under the second apron with whoever they acquire.

Re-Signing Collin Gillespie

Gillespie spent two years in Denver on a two-way, before playing on a two-way in Phoenix last season. This year he signed for the minimum and the Suns hold his early Bird rights this summer.

With those, the Suns could offer Gillespie a four year deal, starting at 105% of the league annual salary, just under $15 million, with 8% raises. Total would be four years, $67 million.

Another team could offer the full non-taxpayer midlevel which would have a slightly (~$700k) higher first year, but be worth about $2 million less over the course of the deal due to only 5% raises. It’s also possible someone with cap space comes with a bigger offer. There may be other suitors, but Phoenix offers legitimate opportunity and things are working in The Valley.

Gillespie currently ranks 19th in EPM for guards. The 19th highest paid guard in average annual value (AAV) is Jalen Brunson at $39,137,281. The 38th is Alex Caruso at $20,274,240.

Even if the Suns gave him the max extension, his AAV would be only $17 million. I think Phoenix has to be willing to go to that, but it may be in both the team and Gillespie’s interest to do a shorter deal.

Austin Reeves got a 3+1 in a similar situation but in hindsight, would have preferred to get back on the market even quicker. This is another thing that gives the Suns an edge over other teams who would use the MLE and need three years to get him full Bird rights.

Both sides would argue to tack on an option; Gillespie with his current performance and the Suns with his limited history. The early bird exception requires two years so we could be talking a straight two year contract. If Gillespie prefers guaranteed money, maybe he’s willing to give a little back on a longer deal.

Result: 2 years, $31 million, no option ($14.9 million year one)

Mark Williams Restricted Free Agency

Williams was selected by the Charlotte Hornets with the 15th overall pick in the first round of the 2022 NBA Draft. The Suns traded for the big man, and thus hold his Bird rights.

With four years of service, Williams next contract could start at 25% of the salary cap and be for up to five years, with 8% raises. That would mean year one, around $41.5 million, and total 5 years, $240 million.

Williams is a starting-level center, but because he played only 106 of a possible 246 games in his first three years, is viewed as an injury risk and will have to concede some money in negotiations because of it. This was also likely to have been a major factor in him not agreeing to an extension last summer.

He is also a restricted free agent. The most another team could offer him up would be around $180 million over four years, but they need cap space to do it. I would rank him behind a number of other free agent centers, including, in no order, Mitchell Robinson, Jalen Duren, and Walker Kessler, the latter two also being RFA.21

That is to say, I think the Suns are in a pretty good position to negotiate here.

Williams currently ranks 19th in EPM for centers. The 19th highest paid center in average annual value (AAV) is Onyeka Okongwu at $15,495,000. Williams’s qualifying offer (QO) will be right around $14 million assuming he meets the starter criteria. I don’t think the Suns can offer much more than that to get him to accept a one year deal and essentially waive his QO no-trade.

Taking the QO is never a good thing for either side and since Phoenix gave up assets to get Williams, I’m thinking they are willing to come to a reasonable deal here. However, because Williams has a short track record due to injury, I think he will have to give up some value and/or accept a team option or non-guarantee.

Result: 3 years, $48 million, team option ($14.8 million year one)

Jordan Goodwin

Goodwin may end up being the odd man out in Phoenix. He has played well enough that multiple teams may be interested in acquiring his services for next season. However, I think most if not all will be offering the minimum. If that is the case, the Suns might look like the most attractive solution given his success this year.

In five years of NBA service, Goodwin’s career earnings total just under $5.7 million. While most competitive guys like to bet on themselves, securing multiple guaranteed years might be important to a guy that has bounced around the league.

If Phoenix is able to re-sign Gillespie and Williams at the numbers above, they would not necessarily need the veterans minimum to be at the 2-year service discount, which only applies to one year contracts.

Restricted free agency has run late into the summer for most players as of recent, so the Suns might not have a clear answer on Mark Williams for a while. But let’s say they take care of Goodwin and give him a two year minimum.

Result: 2 years, $6 million, no option ($2.9 million year one)

Taxpayer Midlevel

Only three teams used the TMLE in 2025-2026.22 Teams that use this exception basically get the cream of the crop vet minimums, but lock themselves into limited flexibility. I would only support going this route if the Suns were able to nab a difference making power forward.

Two guys at different points in their careers that I expect to be out of the Suns range but would be worth it are Kenrich Williams and Jeremy Sochan. Williams has a team option in Oklahoma City but could be a cap casualty. Meanwhile, Sochan’s time is San Antonio seems to have run its course.

Both guys would provide more rebounding and defense while getting a new opportunity. This could look like a prove-it contract, 2 years with a player option. The Suns would hope to build up their value and trade them at next year’s deadline.

If the Suns forego using the MLE, and sign a vet minimum instead, they will have another $3.5 million to spend elsewhere. They could use that towards that one-year deal for Williams if they can’t come to terms on a multi-year deal. They could also sign a 15th player at the minimum.

Result: No MLE used.

Draft

Phoenix does not hold a 2026 first round draft pick. As far as second rounders, they currently own the second most favorable of OKC, DAL and PHL (probably Philly).

With all the young talent on the team, there may not be a ton of space on the NBA roster. I’d prefer for the Suns to come to an agreement to take a player that is willing to go on a two-way and see how it goes from there. Upside is more important than if they can play immediately.

Long-Term Outlook

You’ll notice the trade deadline and free agency sections conflict. The former suggests trading anyone not tied down and the latter suggests running it back with mostly the same team. That’s pretty much the cap situation that the Suns are stuck in.

If they have dreams of aggregating the contracts of Green, Brooks, Allen, and O’Neale in some manner to bring back a star, I’m dubious. Because they are over the first apron, they will have to send out more money than they get back in any trade.

That likely means three of those four guys would have to go out if you are talking about a marquee star and then they’re right back to where they were with Booker and Durant and not enough around them. If they package two guys to go get a fringe all-star, they’re probably still not good enough at the top.

It’s not my money but history shows that owners do not like spending year after year for non-contenders. Suns owner Mat Ishbia has indicated that is fine with him, but even more so than the aprons, the 2023 CBA made the repeater tax a beefed-up deterrent to continued spending.

The Suns are too expensive for guys that would be great bench players on a championship roster, all but Brooks under contract through 2028. While this year has been exciting and fun, I worry it will actually set the Suns even farther back in the long run if they try to double down on what they currently have.

Assuming Booker stays, I’d like to see a 2027-2028 roster with Gillespie, Booker, Dunn, Fleming, Williams, Ighodaro, and Maluach in the rotation. Jalen Green is the wild card. If he gets back healthy and pops in the next year plus, that would be a huge boon. Otherwise, the Suns should be targeting additional guards and wings.

Anyone else currently on the roster should be on the trade block, trying to bring back expiring deals to get costs down, along with picks. Do that enough times, and good things can happen.

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Appendix

Evaluating coaching is an extremely difficult thing to do. Some of the most important things a coach does, building relationships with players, running practices, scouting and preparing for opponents, developing players, etc. happen behind the scenes for most of us. We rely on insider reports or sometimes just infer based on record.

But there are a few things that can be seen during a game, even beyond the X’s and O’s of offensive sets or defensive schemes. The first would be rotations; who is on the floor with each other and against who from the other team. NBA coaches are also faced with decision points in every games: timeouts and challenges.

Timeout rules in the NBA are complicated, which actually gives more opportunity for a coach to gain an advantage if they use them well. Coaches are forced to take timeouts in certain situations and also stand to forfeit timeouts if a minimum amount have not been used by specific time marks. Smart teams use timeouts in cases where they can cut opponent runs, set up after time-out (ATO) plays, or challenge plays before they are forced to take or lose them.

NBA challenges are an opportunity assessment. Coaches must consider both the likelihood and reward of winning the challenge. A foul called on a three-point shot has a much larger reward when a ruling is overturned than an out of bounds call. Coaches must also consider the cost of a lost opportunity for a future challenge, which is often a harsher penalty for losing a challenge than the lost timeout. For that reason, a call in the first quarter may not be worth the risk to challenge and potentially be without for the rest of the game. Even if correct both times, a team has a maximum of two challenges a game.

Let’s take a deeper look at some basic strategy of each…

Timeouts

Each team starts the game with seven (7) timeouts. They may not have more than four (4) timeouts at the end of the 3rd quarter and no more than two (2) timeouts in the last three minutes1. Therefore, there are two milestones in the game where teams stand to lose timeouts if they haven’t been used.

I see this sometimes by the winning team in blowouts, which can be understandable, but as an example, on 2024-05-25, Indiana (Rick Carlisle) lost a timeout at both milestones in an Eastern Conference Finals game that they lost by three.2

In college basketball, mandatory (TV) timeouts occur at 16/12/8/4 minutes left in each half, but they are not charged to either team. In the NBA, there are two mandatory timeouts per quarter and they occur at 7 and 3 minutes left; however, they are charged to teams. Specifically, the first mandatory timeout is charged to the home team and the second to the away team.

But there is an exception. If a timeout has already been taken, the mandatory timeout does not occur. Assuming only one timeout was taken before the 3:00 mark, that mandatory timeout is charged to whichever team did not take the first timeout. If two timeouts are already taken, then the second mandatory timeout does not occur either. In practice, what this means is that teams typically take a timeout before they are forced to, either to break an opponent run or when on offense to design an after-timeout (ATO) play.

In the Western Conference Finals on 2024-05-26, the Mavericks (Jason Kidd) were forced to take timeouts just below the seven minute mark in the first, third, and fourth quarters. While they had the ball in the first two instances, a Dallas non-shooting foul at 6:56 in the final quarter forced a Dallas timeout which Minnesota used to draw up a play for a wide-open Naz Reid three-pointer. Coaches are playing with fire anytime they allow themselves to be in the situation where the next whistle will assign them a timeout.

Challenges

Perhaps the Mavs were only saved from four forced timeouts in that game by losing a challenge in the second quarter at the 11:45 mark. That lost challenge cost them a timeout, but it counted as their mandatory for the quarter. If they had already been charged a timeout in the quarter, this would be a second charged timeout.

But what if they had won that challenge? My previous understanding was that no timeout would be charged. That is actually not true. If the mandatory timeouts for the quarter have not been taken, that challenge timeout, even when the ruling is overturned, counts as the mandatory timeout.

While it is a minor factor in the decision of whether to challenge a call or not, losing a challenge late in a quarter is more punitive than early in a quarter as it costs a second timeout to be charged to the team for the quarter. Conversely, winning a challenge late in a quarter is preferable as it means teams are able to use their mandatory timeout for other benefits.

Another thought when deciding to challenge is the time in the game. Perhaps the biggest downside of an unsuccessful challenge is the loss of future opportunity to challenge, which is why coaches are wary of wasting it early. Teams are allowed one challenge per game and if they win it, they get one additional challenge, but no more than two total even if they win both.

The major factors to consider when choosing a challenge strategy are the reward of overturning a call and the likelihood of it. Teams are only allowed to challenge three things: fouls, goaltending, and out-of-bounds. More specifically, only calls that were made on the floor (not no-calls). In the 2023-2024 season, teams averaged 114.7 points on an average of 99.8 possessions per game, so a good analysis for the reward of an overturned challenge can start with an estimation that a possession is worth 1.15 points. However, this includes transition possessions which are of higher value. For simplicity (and because it’s pretty close to accurate), let’s say a half-court possession is worth 1.00 points.

Out-of-bounds

This is likely the easiest of the challenge options to consider. If a team wins a challenge, it gains one possession (or takes one possession away from the other team), so the reward is 1 point, unless there are other factors to consider, like a low shot clock, in which case the possession is worth less.

These are also the most likely to be overturned, with 2023-2024 challenge data showing that of the 375 out-of-bounds calls that were challenged, 79.2% ended up being changed.

Usually, teams have an assistant coach on the bench with a tablet that can quickly watch replays and communicate to the head coach if it is a challenge that they can win. Out-of-bounds calls are the easiest to quickly identify as wrong (even if the minutes-long delay to review says otherwise).

Goaltending

The next easiest decision is goaltending, which must be challenged by the defense.3 The reward is the number of points that would be scored, usually 2 points, minus the amount stemming from the resumption of play on an overturn, which is typically a jump ball.4

Again for simplicity, let’s say both teams have an equal chance to win the jump ball, where the offensive team would still have approximately a value of 0.5 points on the possession even in the case of an overturn, leaving 1.5 points as the reward of winning the challenge.

The stats for 2023-2024 had 67.5% of these calls overturned but on by far the fewest challenges, only 40.

Fouls

The most complex case, and the one that was challenged by far the most, 1029 times, are fouls. While I don’t have a breakdown by cases, 52.9% of all foul challenges were overturned, the least of the three categories.

Before starting a dive into the different cases, let’s consider the additional rewards for overturning a foul that is not as easily decomposed into points for the possession: a personal foul, which if on a star player with foul trouble could be meaningful, and a team foul, which could lead to a team to more free throw attempts in the bonus.

These are not negligible but are not significant enough that a coach should consider challenging a non-shooting non-bonus foul. An exception might be a loose ball foul that determines possession, in which case the reward is in line with the out-of-bounds analysis.

However, a non-shooting foul when the opponent is already in the bonus would be the same as a missed two-point attempt foul. For our analysis, we will use 80% as the average free throw percentage, although it is dependent on position and player. So these cases would have a reward of 1.1 points (after subtracting the 0.5 for resumption of play from 1.6).

A foul on a missed three point shot would be worth 1.9 points to overturn. Understandably, these fouls on three-point shooters are some of the most common you see challenged.

Cases where the foul might be switched to the the opponent are even more valuable. Although, offensive fouls don’t count towards the bonus in the NBA and the block/charge is an extremely difficult case to get overturned.

The cases that I believe are the most enticing to challenge are leg kicks by three point shooters or illegal screens pushing defenders into shooters, especially three point shooters. Consider these as having a reward of 2.4 points, plus switching a foul from your player to an opponent.

These cases, where the foul could be switched, are even further increased on a made basket and challenge against the and-one, which in the above three-point scenarios would have a reward of a whopping 3.8 points. A coach would only need to win 21% of these challenges to equal the value of an average out-of-bounds challenge.

Of course, if it were an and-one case where the challenge were only hoping to remove the foul rather than reassign it to the offense, the reward for an overturned challenge would only be 0.8 points.

Coaching staffs likely have a quick reference chart similar to below5. A coach could slightly increase or decrease the projected value based on the players involved or the confidence in the likelihood of the call being overturned.

*Likelihood values based on scenario. Breakdown of foul cases estimated.

When the Bucks chose to waive and stretch Damian Lillard, it is more than likely that the Suns and Bradley Beal were already deep into negotiations about what a buyout would look like. After a failed big-three attempt, Phoenix had moved Kevin Durant to Houston but were still sitting above the second apron without an obvious path to contention. A buyout for Beal would allow them to duck under that threshold and likely under the luxury tax as well by the end of the year to avoid being a repeater tax team this year.

The problem: Nassir Little and E.J. Liddell. The Suns previously used the stretch provision in 2024 on the remaining $21,750,000 of Little’s contract (seven-year stretch) and $2,120,694 of Liddell’s contract (three-year stretch). According to Article VII, Section 7(d), Paragraph 6(iii)(A) of the CBA:

“In no event shall a Team be permitted to elect to stretch a waived player’s Salary if the portion of the Team’s Team Salary representing all of the Team’s waived players (and any other former players) in any future Salary Cap Year exceeds or as a result of the proposed stretch would exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the Salary Cap in effect during the Salary Cap Year in which the election occurs.”

With the salary cap at $154,647,000 in 2025-2026, the Suns are only allowed to carry $23,197,050 of stretched money (15%). That meant Beal’s contract could remain on the books for up to $19,383,009 for each of the next five years, a total of $96,915,045. But that amount was $13,879,835 less than the $110,794,880 remaining on his contract, including his option year in 2026-2027. Hence, the need for the buyout.

An argument could be made that the Suns would have been better off playing out the rest of Beal’s contract or negotiating buyout but not choosing to stretch the cap hit (they have until the end of August to elect) but it seems like the stretch is the path they have chosen. With that option available, it was up to Beal to decide if he was willing to give that money up, knowing that unlike Lillard’s set-off situation, he would not have any set-off on his next contract as it is typically waived in a buyout as allowed by Article XXVII, Section 4 of the CBA.1

After surveying the market, Beal decided the Clippers remaining portion of their midlevel exception, $5,354,000, was going to be his best option. He signed for a one-plus-one to give himself the option to re-up with Los Angeles in 2026-2027, but that is more of an insurance policy. Ideally, he will be seeking more money next summer.

The Clippers would be able to use his non-bird rights only to bring him back at 120% of this year’s salary but Beal would be better off signing into either the Clippers' or another team’s cap space; however, those opportunities have been limited in recent free agency. The next best bet is to get the full non-taxpayer midlevel exception, which is projected to be about $15,091,280 if the NBA’s projection of a 7% salary cap increase holds true.

If that happens, one narrative you may hear is that Beal made back what he gave up in his buyout and then some. Let’s dive into the financials and evaluate that claim.

View or download your copy of the workbook here.

While non-cap related details of player contracts are sometimes hard to come by, Mark Stein explains why it took until July 16^th for Beal to accept a buyout when the terms the Suns were willing to offer were clear long before then. Beal was due an advance payment of a quarter of his annual salary, $13,416,568, on July 15^th, as described in Article II, Section 3(d)(z) of the CBA.2 His advance could not have been scheduled until at least one week after the end of the July moratorium as stated in Article II, Section 13(f) of the CBA.3

While some have insinuated waiting for this payment was a last shot at the Suns to force them to write Beal a check on his way out the door, this was just good business. Had Beal agreed to the buyout any earlier, that money would have gone into the stretch and been spread over the next five years. That mistake would have cost him $1,680,773 in today’s dollars with our estimate’s default assumptions: 50% take home, 8% investment growth, full escrow return.

Now given that Beal and his agent clearly value getting his money earlier, and since they seem to have been able to negotiate everything under the sun in this deal with the Wizards, I think it’s reasonable for this exercise to assume he was due another quarter of his salary on October 1^st as allowed in the clause above. Furthermore, let’s assume Beal is being paid over the course of six months instead of the entire year as allowed in Article II, Section 3(d)(y) of the CBA.4

Does negotiating these early payments really matter? Looking back to when the deal was originally signed with Washington in the summer of 2022, before we knew a stretch was coming, the net present value of the shift from standard to early payments was $4,531,276 in Bradley Beal’s favor. That includes advance payments of 25% each on July 15^th and October 1^st, twelve semi-monthly payments instead of twenty-four, and escrow payment in a single check rather than across the remainder of the year-long payment schedule.5 But all that goes away once the Suns waived-and-stretched his contract.6

Where does that leave Bradley Beal?

He may not be able to negotiate the same payment schedule with his new teams since it does not seem he will have the same leverage that he once did with the Wizards. If he does indeed sign for the full midlevel exception next year but on a standard payment schedule, he will have lost $2,847,237 in net present value take home pay, as opposed to playing out his contract in Phoenix.7 To break even financially, Beal will need to demand $20,032,772 from a team willing to use their cap space on him next summer.

Of course, there are many non-monetary reasons for him to take the buyout and move on with his career. The situation in Phoenix was clearly not working and the Clippers stand to have a better chance at contention this year. He may even make back some money in playoff or NBA cup bonuses and his long-term contract outlook in 2027-2028 and beyond might be better on this path.

But unless he does entice a team to spend over 20 million dollars on him in 2026-2027, he will have lost out on some value in this buyout, despite what you may hear others say.

If you’ve enjoyed this, you might want to check out the rest of the Summer Stretch Series 2025:

• Damian Lillard and the Bucks

• Damian Lillard and the Blazers

• Bradley Beal and the Suns/Clippers

And if you prefer watching instead of reading, I’ve created a companion video that ties it all together — watch it here

Faced with a surprise free agency and staring down a market where only one team, the Brooklyn Nets, had cap space, Damian Lillard’s options were limited to say the least. Landing a three-year contract starting at the full non-taxpayer midlevel exception in a year where he will be recovering from an Achilles injury is a boon. If Lillard rebounds to near his previous form, he will be on a discount next year, but able to opt out in 2027 and sign one more solid contract. Otherwise, at age 37, he can opt in to that third year and reevaluate his career options in 2028.

That’s a good thing for Lillard since he may be losing nearly seven million dollars in net present value on his previous contract, as we recently analyzed what effect Milwaukee’s waive and stretch would have. And now that Dame has signed another professional contract, that number is going to go even higher! For every dollar that Portland pays, the Bucks get to keep a little bit more thanks to the CBA’s set-off provision in Article XXVII, Section 1(a).1

Lillard’s new contract has an interesting format, starting at $14,104,000, with a 5% decrease in the second year, and a return to the original number in the third year. Milwaukee can reduce all 120 months of their stretch payments by an amount related to the new contract’s first year salary, and by and additional amount related to the new contract’s second year salary over the final 96 months as described by Article XXVII, Section 5(a).2

View or download your copy of the workbook here.

For this exercise, we are ignoring the final year of the Blazers contract because it is beyond the timeline of Lillard’s original contract in Milwaukee so the Bucks can’t set-off any portion of it. Still making assumptions of 50% as the default take home percentage with an 8% annual investment rate, and all escrow eventually returned, the net present value of the first two years of the Portland contract is $16,496,960, as far as today’s dollars into Dame’s bank account.

Unfortunately for him, the set-off net present value is (-$6,138,884) so Lillard will only actually see about 63% of the value of the first two years of this new contract. Luckily, that net $10,358,075 is still enough to bring him back above water when combined with the amount lost when he was cut by Milwaukee (-$6,943,737), bringing Lillard’s final financial change this summer to a positive $3,414,339. In the end, not too bad a summer for Dame. He gets a little extra money in his pocket and a chance to rehab and play at least one more season closer to family in Portland.

But this is a great deal for the Bucks too, who originally owed Lillard nearly 135 million dollars in NPV on an extension that was just kicking in.3 Between the amount they will save in the stretch ($13,887,473) and this set-off ($12,277,769), Milwaukee will keep over 26 million dollars in today’s money. Recouping nearly twenty percent of the sunk cost on the contract of a 35-year-old player that will miss at least half of that time with injury is pretty good business for the Bucks.

While Lillard had no say in the matter with Milwaukee, another situation was brewing out west that couldn’t be solved unilaterally. The day before Dame signed his Portland contract, Bradley Beal agreed to be waived-and-stretched by the Phoenix Suns, giving back money in the process. While there won’t be any set-off to deal with, we will evaluate his decision involving both a buyout and an altered payment schedule in the final article and worksheet of this 2025 summer stretch series.

If you’ve enjoyed this, you might want to check out the rest of the Summer Stretch Series 2025:

• Damian Lillard and the Bucks

• Damian Lillard and the Blazers

• Bradley Beal and the Suns/Clippers

And if you prefer watching instead of reading, I’ve created a companion video that ties it all together — watch it here

On July 1^st, 2025, the Milwaukee Bucks waived Damian Lillard to make room to sign Miles Turner. In a world where nearly every NBA move is known and hinted at in advance, this one caught people by surprise. Dame’s time in Milwaukee ended abruptly on the day his 2-year, $112 million dollar extension took effect.

NBA fans lamented that the Dame/Giannis pick-and-roll never became as lethal as they fantasied. They were drawn back into the grief of a string of Achilles injuries that plagued an otherwise exciting postseason, Lillard’s being the first. And while it seemed unempathetic to toss aside a player that had gotten hurt playing for them, the Bucks had every right to do so. The NBA is a business; plus, Dame will get all his money…

Right?? Well, kind of…

Funny enough, the salary cap mechanics in the NBA have become better understood than how the cash gets transferred from team to player. As far as the Bucks cap space calculations are concerned, Lillard’s remaining salary, $112,583,016, will be stretched across the next five seasons (his two years remaining, times two, plus one) leaving Milwaukee with $22,516,603 of dead money on their books for each season through 2029-2030.

While that anchor will hang on Milwaukee’s cap sheet for some time, it gave the Bucks the room they needed to make a last gasp effort to convince Giannis that they were doing everything they could to remain a contender. General Manager Jon Horst said as much, speaking to Eric Nehm of The Athletic. Whether you like the move from a team building perspective, or see it as a desperate attempt at relevance for an organization that is turning a blind eye to its imminent forthcoming rebuild, neither matters to Damian Lillard now.

“Dame still gets his $100M over 2 years, right? And The stretch is just for the bucks cap hit?” [sic]

Ignoring the grammatical errors and incorrect total, this question came from a knowledgeable user in a reasonably well-informed discord server. Other users chimed in to support the initial claim, perhaps because it seems only fair, but according to Article II, Section 4(k), Paragraph ii(y) of the CBA, it’s just not the case.

“The remaining Base Compensation, if any, owed to the player pursuant to Exhibit 2 of the Contract shall be aggregated and paid in equal amounts per year over a period equal to twice the number of NBA Seasons (including any Season covered by a Player Option Year) remaining on this Contract following the date upon which the request for waivers occurred, plus one NBA Season.”

The “mandatory stretch provision” applies any time a player contract is terminated. That is to say that whether or not the Bucks had chosen to use the stretch provision in relation to the cap hit of the contract, the payment is automatically stretched, and this is non-negotiable.

It’s reasonable to assume that the overlap of those who study the NBA salary cap and those who have some interest in personal finance is probably decently high. For the latter, the concept of the time value of money looms large here. There is a big difference in being paid over two years instead of over five. Let’s take a look and see if we can estimate how much.

View or download your copy of the workbook here.

Before we dig into the nitty-gritty of the effect of the payment stretch, let’s address one thing right off the bat: the numbers that we all see reported as player’s salaries are placeholder values. They are usually close to accurate. But the actual amount a player is paid is not determined until the end of the season, after the league’s annual accounting review that occurs during the July moratorium, when the final calculation of the year’s basketball related income (BRI) is complete.

Players are guaranteed to receive between 49% and 51% of BRI, although they typically get the 51%. However, there are instances where the sum of the player’s placeholder values exceeds that proportion. To combat that, players have their paychecks docked 10%, which goes to an escrow account that can be paid back to the teams in the above-described scenario.

In 2024-2025, 9.14% went back to the teams with 0.86% returned to the players, as initially reported by Eric Pincus of Bleacher Report. This is less likely to be the case in 2025-2026, where the salary cap is set to rise by the maximum allowed 10%, indicating that BRI is projected to grow by more than this amount. However, in 2026-2027, where the league is projecting only a 7% salary cap increase, your guess is as good as mine how the escrow will be divvied up. For this estimation, I have set the default in the calculator to be that Lillard will receive the full amount of his escrow back.

As to the timeline of the payments defined in his contract, those types of details are not as readily available to the public. Absent any additional information, let’s assume for the purpose of this exercise that the standard payment schedule applies as defined in Paragraph 3(a) of the Uniform Player Contract1 with escrow payment as described in Article VII, Section 12(c), Paragraph 2 of the CBA.2

As to how much of his gross pay Dame sees hit his account: subtract taxes, agent fees, NBPA fees, and I’m sure some other things we aren’t aware of. The worksheet uses 50% as his default take home percentage with an 8% annual growth rate, which is likely on the conservative side for someone with millions to invest.

Even with that significant chunk removed from his take home pay, the $112 million that got stretched over five years would be worth a total of $68,360,158 when Lillard cashed his final paycheck on October 15^th, 2030. That’s not too shabby. But had his payment not been stretched, he’d have $76,216,358 by that 2030 date, receiving his last paycheck on that same day in 2027 and letting that money grow.

Damian Lillard lost $6,943,737 in net present value when he was waived by the Bucks.

Not that you need to shed any tears for Dame; he is a beloved basketball star and an extremely well paid one at that. But before you wave it off as “NBA is a business”, know that he effectively lost almost seven million dollars out of his pocket when Milwaukee made this move.3

But will he make that back in his next deal? We will explore that additional contract along with the set-off that Milwaukee is entitled to in a future article and worksheet to see how far, if any, he might come out ahead.

If you’ve enjoyed this, you might want to check out the rest of the Summer Stretch Series 2025:

• Damian Lillard and the Bucks

• Damian Lillard and the Blazers

• Bradley Beal and the Suns/Clippers

And if you prefer watching instead of reading, I’ve created a companion video that ties it all together — watch it here